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Preface 
This paper is written as part of the research project Autonomy, Transparency and 
Management – Three Reform Programs in Health Care (ATMhealth) at the Stein 
Rokkan Centre for Social Research.  
The aim of ATMhealth is to study such processes of reform and change within the 
Norwegian health care sector, make comparisons with Sweden, Denmark and other 
countries, and estimate the consequences of such reforms. Three research areas are 
emphasized:   
 
1) AUTONOMY. The ambition to establish autonomous organizational units, 
with a focus on the health enterprise.  
2) TRANSPARENCY. The dynamics involved in the strive for transparency, 
exemplified by the introduction of still more detailed instruments for monitoring 
of performance and quality, as well as patient’s rights to choose and be 
informed.  
3) MANAGEMENT. To establish a more professional and distinct managerial role 
at all levels is a major ambition for most of the recent reform programs.  
 
A comparative research design is employed – regional, cross-national and global – in 
order to analyze the relationship between reform activities, organizational changes and 
service provision. The aims are to:  
 
• Generate research on the preconditions for change in health care by the means 
of comparative research  
• General competence development in organization and management of health 
care  
• assist the health institutions in their efforts to improve service delivery and 
create more innovative structures for organization and management.  
 
The funding for ATMhealth comes from the Norwegian Research Council and more 
specifically FIFOS,  Research fund for innovation and renewal in the public sector. The 
purpose of this fund is to create a concerted, multidisciplinary , long-term research 
effort, in order to encourage organizational changes and innovation in the public sector, 
and create the common solutions for the public sector of the future.  
 
Haldor Byrkjeflot, project director  
 
More information about ATMhealth at:  
http://www.rokkansenteret.uib.no/vr/rokkan/ATM/index.html
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Abstract 
Better management and new organizational forms have been the preferred solutions in 
the efforts to slow down the rising expenditures in Norwegian hospitals. This has been 
explicitly expressed in a new law on health personnel and health enteprises, in which 
Norwegian hospitals have been required to implement the principle of unitary 
management. The introduction of unitary management and the belief in a new 
accountable and empowered manager seems to represent a break with traditional forms 
of management, like parallel professional hierarchies and representative structures. The 
authors have studied how a group of clinical managers, all members of the top-
management team in a middle sized Norwegian hospital, has adjusted to the new 
demands for unitary management and the restructuring of hospitals. 
A key question is how clinic managers themselves perceive and adjust to the new 
roles and tasks they have been assigned. Managers try to enact their own importance by 
implementing performance management. However, this enactment leaves the managers 
more visible, transparent and vulnerable. The professional hierarchies in Norwegian 
healthcare have been based on professional imperatives of action and a logic of 
appropriateness. Another question discussed in the paper is whether these imperatives 
and logics are now  replaced by a new logic of consequentiality, or whether they may 
continue to exist in a state of competition or in combination with the new managerial 
logic of consequentiality. 
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Sammendrag  
Satsing på bedre ledelse og nye organisasjonsformer har stått i sentrum for de senere 
årenes initiativ for å bremse utgiftsveksten i norske sykehus. Dette har bl.a. kommet til 
uttrykk i den nye loven om helsepersonell – hvor norske sykehus fra 2002 er blitt pålagt 
å implementere prinsippet om  enhetlig ledelse. Introduksjon av «enhetlig ledelse» og 
troen på et nytt ansvarliggjort og bemyndiget lederskap fremstår som et brudd med de 
tidligere tradisjoner for parallelle faghierarkier og kollegiale, representative ledelses-
strukturer. I denne artikkelen har en undersøkt hvordan klinikksjefer, dvs. toppleder-
gruppen i et mellomstort norsk sykehus har tilpasset seg i forhold til de nye 
rammebetingelsene, blant annet foretaksorganisering. Et viktig spørsmål er hvordan 
klinikksjefer selv forstår og tilpasser seg til sine nye roller og oppgaver. I sin nye rolle 
som enhetsledere er klinikksjefene underlagt skiftende krav og hensyn. I streben etter 
resultat og autonomi forsøker de å iscenesette sin egen betydning. Denne iscene-
settingen gjør dem mer synlige, transparente og sårbare. Artikkelen drøfter også i 
hvilken grad tidligere handlingsimperativer og normbaserte logikker (the logic og 
appropriateness) som var innebygd i de medisinske faghierarkier utfordres, konkurrerer 
eller alternativt lar seg forene med den nye management logikken, dvs. «the logic of 
consequentiality». 
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«Now, I experience my role as leader as much more strategic and change-oriented than before. 
Clinical directorate managers, in particular, are jointly responsible for developing strategy; what 
the hospital should do, what the strengths and weaknesses are, and what to build upon in the 
further development of the hospital. This was not specified in the former structure – until we got 
the enterprise structure.» 
Introduction 
The clinic manager quoted above indicates that the conditions for exercising 
management in the Norwegian hospital sector have changed (cf. also Sommervold 1997, 
Vareide 2001, 2002). New demands for management were  laid down by the Norwegian 
Parliament when it established that all hospital departments had to implement unitary 
management from 2002. At least formally, this puts an end to the dual, collegial and 
representative management structures that have been an old tradition in managing 
Norwegian hospitals. A trend towards more unified management structures in public 
services has been recognised also in the other Scandinavian countries (Østergren and 
Sahlin-Andersson 1998) and indeed in the public sector at large in many Anglo-Saxon 
(oriented) countries (Clarke and Newman 1997; Considine and Painter 1997; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000). The introduction of unitary management in the hospital sector can be 
understood as the implementation of one of a few cornerstone ideas in realizing the idea 
of performance management, or management by objectives (Drucker 1955), as a basis 
for governing public services (Gammelsæter 2002). In order to realize performance 
management, managers must be given full accountability in terms of meeting objectives 
sanctioned at higher levels of authority. Other cornerstone ideas are the separation of 
strategic and operational functions, the disaggregation of multi-product or multi-market 
organization units into more manageable product-market performance units, and market 
competition.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate and assess the role that managers play in 
realizing performance management as an ideal model of managing public sector service 
institutions. How do the unitary managers of clinical directorates themselves understand 
their roles and tasks? Do they experience that the structural conditions put in place 
actually help them fulfil their roles, or do they, as Mintzberg long ago argued (1979), 
involve themselves in a giant power game not only between themselves but also in their 
relations to the headquarters or to other vested interests? Are we witnessing the 
emergence of a structure in which «the middle line», i.e. unit managers, makes up the 
key part of the organization to drive it further towards disaggregation and the enhancing 
of autonomy in performance units? Or do institutional mechanisms dampen their 
inclination to build up power in their own units? Will the claim for internal and external 
transparency in the forms of performance tables or opinion polls effectively restrain the 
ambitions of managers, or will such mechanisms only make them perform better? 
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Management between autonomy 
and transparency 
The introduction of unitary management into the hospital sector can be understood 
against the backdrop of the implementation of the idea of performance management, or 
management by objectives (Drucker 1955), as a basis for governing public services. In 
the wake of the widespread growth of the M-form structure among large commercial 
companies (Whittington and Mayer 2000), the organization of public services is also 
becoming ever more based on the idea that organizations should primarily be managed 
on the basis of setting and meeting performance targets and indicators (Gammelsæter 
2002). Although still present, the ideas of the Weberian bureaucracy, which privilege 
governance by the standardization of procedures and work processes and, in a more 
recent fashion, professional skills, are not elevated any more as the ideals of managing 
modern public institutions.  
Given this shift in the premise for managing large organizations, a number of actions 
follow almost logically. First of all, if the unit or organization is accountable according 
to predefined objectives, and not primarily according to the means and processes by 
which some ideals are met, its management must necessarily be given great autonomy in 
finding ways to achieve the objectives. Instead of supervising whether the execution of 
work itself meets parochial standard procedures, organization owners (or top manage-
ment) must set clear performance targets for lower level managers, while at the same 
time giving them the freedom to formulate what their own targets are and how the goals 
sanctioned by their superiors should be fulfilled. This is what is often referred to as 
devolution or decentralization of decision-making, but it is also a system in which 
overriding strategy-formulation, performance control and managerial power is retained 
at the apex of the organization (Drucker 1955).  
Second, to achieve performance management, the idea of separation between 
strategic and operational management is a key requirement. The idea of having top 
management rule by objectives and results is exactly that it eliminates the need for 
management to involve itself in rules, details and workmanship at the operational level 
(Chandler 1962). Without this separation top management will involve itself in 
operations, and thereby interfere with the freedom that lower level managers are 
expected to enjoy in their pursuit of better ways of meeting performance measures 
(Drucker 1955). If top management interferes, how can the unit manager be held fully 
responsible for the unit’s performance? 
Third, to ensure that performance management works it is essential that the 
organization is disaggregated into separate units (‘divisions’) that operate according to 
their own specific and measurable objectives. Without such separation, clear objectives 
are difficult to define, borders of accountability are easily blurred and there is basically 
no legitimate way to hold managers responsible for results. To prevent infighting 
between units in the case of confusion, superior senior managers would under such 
circumstances be forced to consider details, task execution and work processes to 
evaluate performance. This would lead to the violation of the idea of separation 
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between strategic and operational management, and effectively undermine performance 
management.  
Fourth, when units are separated, their managers are given full accountability in 
terms of meeting objectives sanctioned at higher levels of authority. Since managers are 
measured according to the unit’s performance, it is a personal responsibility of unit 
managers at all levels to take charge so that objectives are met. If necessary they can 
remove personnel, including managers at lower levels, who are perceived to stand in the 
way of success. High salaries and performance-related bonuses are frequently justified 
by personal accountability, the expected motivational effect of profit sharing, and the 
presumed competition for the best managers.  
Lastly, performance management is essentially pointless without competition. 
Meeting objectives makes no sense unless one knows whether the objective spurs more 
effort, innovativeness, efficiency and progress, in relative terms. The creation of 
separate units subjected to goals and comparative performance indicators ideally prepare 
the ground for comparison. In principle, the units within such a system compete with 
external competitors, and consequently their performance must be comparable. This is 
market competition. But the units also compete with each other for internal resources, 
for instance in terms of investments, or nowadays knowledge, since the owner in the 
last resort is expected to spend the resources where the returns are highest. If the owner 
does not allocate the resources according to this idea but according to his likes and 
dislikes, performance management is in principle undermined.  
Although it can be argued that all these ideas are closely related and that performance 
management cannot  be fully realized unless they are all implemented, decision-makers 
do not necessarily understand this or venture to implement all the ideas simultaneously. 
The Nordic countries, for instance, are noted for their prudence in implementing what 
is often referred to as new public management techniques (Olsen and Peters 1996; 
Christensen and Lægreid 2001). Hence, whereas management by objectives was 
introduced as a new logic of management in the hospital sector many years ago, the 
implementation of management accountability culminating in the unitary management 
model has a more recent origin in Norway. The enterprise reform has been said to 
diverge from the more prudent Norwegian reform strategy in its devolution of 
authorities to boards and managers of performance units. Once in place, however, one 
of the interesting questions is whether the new managers themselves push performance 
management further in the direction of enhancing their autonomy and their room for 
competitive manoeuvre.  
The elevated focus on managerialism in the literature on public management reform 
arises of course from the key role granted to unit managers responsible for producing 
the prescribed outputs in public institutions gradually being based on performance 
management. As argued above, the creation of autonomous performance units logically 
implies that management becomes more important and at the same time less restrained 
by rules and procedures. Management, in this sense, must be understood as less rule 
enforcement and as an increase in the managers’ discretion to influence structures, 
systems and personnel in ways that enhance the unit’s prospects of meeting its 
objectives, be they financial or qualitative. In this new context it is not surprising if 
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managers sense the expectations to «manage» in a way that is noticeably different from 
management in the past.  
It is of course not true that managers even in private companies live in a world void 
of legal or procedural restrictions whatsoever. In the real world performance 
management leans on many well-known bureaucratic devices, such as line hierarchies 
and procedures concerning personnel, quality, environment and performance reports 
and audits. Following the introduction of performance management there has been a 
growing public interest  in the actual performance of public organizations. This is to be 
expected because the introduction of performance management principles are often 
legitimized as a way of cutting costs and increasing quality for the client, and in the 
hospital sector as cutting waiting lists and providing better treatment. To satisfy the 
taxpayers, the politicians, the patient organizations and the media, procedures for 
control, performance and evaluation are required. These are devices that provide 
performance data that is used by management itself in achieving set targets, but they 
also provide information that public stakeholders must receive in order to review the 
achievement and increasingly the competitive advantage of public institutions, such as in 
the hospital sector where the freedom to choose a hospital has been legally enacted in 
the EU as well as in many countries.  
Particularly in public organizations that are susceptible to some sort of political 
control, the other side of performance management is increased transparency of the 
organization. It is to be expected that the transparency aspects increase rather than 
decrease the modern performance managers’ discretion and room for manoeuvring. In 
this sense it can be proposed that the modern managers in public organizations  are 
easily trapped in the tension between autonomy and transparency. The ‘entrapment’ 
created by the tension between the quest for managerial autonomy and public scrutiny is 
susceptible to intensification by internal power games in the organization or sector. If 
changes in organizations influence the balance of power between vested interests and 
also bring new interests onto the stage, the performance systems and information 
produced may become the object of definition, translation, negotiation and outright 
conflicts that are brought into the public realm.  
An issue that is particularly relevant when it comes to reforming public sector 
institutions is the shift from professional to performance management. There is reason 
to believe that the introduction of unitary management in institutions that have 
traditionally been built on dual structures of management, like the hospitals, threatens 
the power of professional groups, particularly those that have been most powerful in the 
past. Consequently, modern public reforms have been accused of being based on anti-
professionalism (e.g. Ackroyd 1995). Since performance management is closely 
connected to devices like framework budgeting and accrual accounting, financial matters 
are easily put at the top of the agenda of the performance manager. Management 
decisions motivated by cost cutting or earnings potential can run counter to ethical or 
quality ideals held by the professional workforce, and conflicts may arise. Particularly in 
institutions based on a public legacy, such conflicts may spill over to the general public, 
and hence intensify the (apparent) transparency of the institution. 
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The Norwegian hospital enterprise 
reform 
January 1st 2002, the responsibility for the public hospitals in Norway was transferred 
from the county level to the central government. Five regional stately owned health 
enterprises was established, organizing 250 hospitals and health institutions under the 
jurisdiction of 47 local health enterprises. The local enterprises vary in size, number of 
hospitals and geographical span. 
The transfer of ownership from the counties to the state more or less coincided with 
the extension of patient rights towards the free choice of hospitals, and the decision to 
reject the traditional bipartite model of management in favour of a unified management 
model. Taken together, these reforms can be seen as representing three kinds of 
ambitions; first, an attempt to establish organizational autonomy by way of devolution 
of power to enterprise boards, second, an attempt to achieve public transparency by way 
of supplying the patients with information that makes choice of hospital meaningful, 
and third, an attempt to achieve more professional and accountable hospital 
management. Against the background of the traditional public-administrative system for 
managing the hospital sector, these reforms express an ambitious effort to transform the 
sector into a more decentralized, transparent and yet well-managed system.  
The previous public-administrative system was based upon the idea that the county 
hospitals should be financed by fixed government grants that was based on «objective 
criteria» of health needs and equality in service provision, expressed in regional and 
national health plans. An important precondition for this relatively stable, hospital-based 
and place-bound system was a centralized employment policy, encompassing 
professional groups and in particular a medical profession that took a key role in 
planning as well as in the allocation of positions and resources (Erichsen 1996). Another 
precondition was the anticipation that the government would finance the deviations that 
occurred between planned costs and actual costs in running the hospitals.  
In contrast, the new enterprises at both regional and local levels are designed as 
autonomous performance units that are expected to find their own ways of allocating 
and raising funds. According to this model it is no longer an option to turn to the 
government for more resources when deficits occur. Instead, the enterprises have to run 
their businesses almost like private companies; raising their revenues and/or cutting 
their costs to balance their budgets. It logically follows from this model that managers in 
hospitals and clinics are expected to behave as active and energetic general managers, i.e. 
management is their profession and their concentration is on their unit’s performance 
according to agreed upon objectives. It also follows from the model that these 
objectives are first and foremost financial, and hence quality objectives or the possible 
professional or public disagreement over what constitutes good health provision is not 
regarded to be in conflict with the financial targets. Given that information about quality 
is transparent, the patients’ choice of hospital will make sure that the best providers also 
attract the necessary financial resources. 
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Hence, the development of the new role 
of unitary management in the Norwegian 
enterprises, hospitals and clinics can be 
understood as taking place within a context 
of tension between, on the one hand, a new 
structural model that assumes strategic and 
operational autonomy at the level of perfor-
mance units, and, on the other hand, the 
pressure to develop information systems and 
strategies that give the public a much more 
complete insight into the quality of treatment 
of the respective service providers, in effect 
making the hospitals much more transparent 
(cf. figure 1).  
Data and methods 
The empirical study reported in this paper is primarily based on observations, one (semi-
structured) group interview, and (semi-structured) interviews with individual middle-
line-managers (i.e. clinic managers) and general managers in one hospital belonging to 
one of the regional enterprises in Norway. The data was collected by the first author 
alone, about one year after the introduction of unitary management in the Norwegian 
hospital sector. Thus, the collection of data took place during what must be regarded an 
«early learning phase» of the regional enterprise – characterised as it was by massive 
organisational change. At this time restructuring, mergers, staff reductions and 
functional reorganization was commonplace within the health enterprise. At the 
moment of writing cost reductions amounted to nearly NOK 900 millions (or eight per 
cent of total budget) and lay-offs are anticipated. The enterprise employs more than 
1,800 people and serves approximately 80,000 citizens. The hospital is a specialist clinic 
and as such serves as a local hospital for 45,000 citizens. It provides emergency 
treatment and most specialist services. The hospital has a clinical structure, i.e., surgery, 
medical and psychiatric units, as well as service and operational units (cf. figure 2). 
Structural 
autonomy
Public 
transparency
Unitary management 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
In the semi-structured group interviews the entire group of clinic managers as well as 
those managing the other units took part (see figure 2). The interview had the form of a 
«dialogue seminar» in which the individual managers spoke more or less spontaneously 
and presented different views of the topics listed in the interview guide sheet. The 
researcher’s task was to keep the discussion within the topic framework and to manage 
the turn-taking in the conversation. The conversation or dialogue went along several 
lines, i.e. between the researcher and the individual respondents as well as among the 
respondents themselves. Their contributions to the group interview had the character of 
an exchange of experiences, a summing up of their role experiences based on their 
position as managers during the first year of the regional enterprise history. In addition 
to sharing their experiences in adapting to their new roles, the managers were also asked 
what they considered to be most important for their style of management, what tasks 
and focuses they regarded as essential to their performance, and what dilemmas and 
conflicts they faced. Moreover, they were asked to describe what they considered the 
extent of their own autonomy and freedom to act, what kind of collaborative relations 
and integration they experienced within the group of clinic managers, and so on.  
The group interview lasted for about three hours, altogether. It was later followed up 
by a supplementary interview with two of the clinic managers, representing the 
psychiatric unit and the service unit. The supplementary interview lasted for roughly one 
hour and a half and broadly took up the same topics as the group interview. Still, this 
interview aimed more specifically at elaborating and clarifying central questions in 
relation to the new managerial role which the interviewer felt he had not grasped 
sufficiently in the group interview. 
In addition to the hospital managers, the regional enterprise chief executive and 
several other enterprise managers (section managers) have been interviewed. All the 
interviews were taped, transcribed and analysed in their entirety. The interview data have 
been supplemented by available secondary data, including documents about the 
organization development process that the hospital had been undergoing for the last 
couple of years. These are management documents, strategic plans and job descriptions. 
The translations of any quotes later in the paper are ours. 
Managing director
Psych.  Medical ServiceSurgery Oper.
Finance Pers. 
Clinic managers 
Research
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The new definition of hospital 
management  
Interestingly, the change from the previously bipartite structure (parallel hierarchies) to a 
unitary structure of management was introduced before the decision to transfer the 
ownership of the hospitals from the counties to the state. Unitary responsibility in 
management was introduced in a new law about specialist health services that was put 
into effect on January 1st 2001 (cf. § 3–9 on hospital management). The consequence 
was that all hospitals and hospital units had to appoint one person to be ultimately 
responsible for running the unit.  
The introduction of unitary management can be seen as a logical act given that the 
Norwegian parliament in the late 1980s decided that the modernization of the state 
should be premised on the principle of performance management (Gammelsæter 2002). 
In the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the discourse about management in the 
public sector was much influenced by the followers of the American management guru 
(in Norwegian private companies) George Kenning who was propagating that 
management must be treated as a profession and that any manager had to be completely 
accountable for the performance of her/his unit. Prominent private sector opinion 
leaders (including the chief executive of the Norwegian employers’ association) attacked 
the way the public sector was organised and run, and the discourse of management in 
the public sector had to consider whether private sector ideas were appropriate for the 
management of public institutions.  
This was evident when in 1990 a committee appointed by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs (the Andersland committee) proposed that the Kenning-style of management 
was to be introduced in the hospitals (Byrkjeflot 1999). The committee claimed that 
there were serious management problems in the health care sector and that these were 
rooted in the fact that management historically had been a function of the professional 
authority of doctors and their monopoly of managerial positions in the professional 
hierarchy of hospitals. However, the proposal was met with substantial resistance 
among the doctors, and it was dismissed, at least temporarily. Some years later, however, 
although in a slightly new disguise, similar ideas about management was put on the 
agenda by the so-called «the Patient first!» committee (NOU 1997:2):  
«The committee regards the function of management as crucial with respect to the idea that 
hospitals should always take responsibility for the needs of their patients. The committee 
emphasises that the proposed changes to a great extent call for a new style of hospital 
management. Since the manager is running an organisational unit – management should not be 
restricted to one particular professional group. Management should be unitary.» (NOU 1997:2, 
chapter 10.1.1) 
The momentum of these management ideas was confirmed when the parliament in 
2000 adopted the Specialist Health Service Act and was again confirmed when the 
Ministry of Health in the preparation of the ownership reform interrelated the questions 
of ownership, responsibility and management:  
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«The Ministry of Health regards it as essential that the framework for hospital management is 
clearly established. This is particularly important with regard to ownership, as the enterprise 
reform is expected to contribute significantly towards a clarification of terms. However it is 
equally important to define and specify the responsibilities which will be placed with managers at 
different levels within the hospitals.» (Ot. Prop. 66 (2000–2001) About health enterprise 
27.2., our translation) 
It is beyond doubt that the reformers view the development of a new management role 
as one of the pillars of the Norwegian hospital reform (Vareide 2002). Management is 
regarded a profession in its own right that is not derivative of any other profession, 
including medicine in the hospital sector. Rather than being related to any other 
profession or professional peers, management, and the individual manager, are expected 
to be loyal to the organisation alone (Byrkjeflot 1999). Personal qualities and moral 
imperatives are aimed at a will to lead, to take charge and to exert influence on behalf of 
the well-being of the organization itself.  
Making sense of the new definition 
of management 
How then has the new definition of hospital management been translated, interpreted 
and implemented at the clinic level in the local health enterprise? The clinic managers 
find themselves in an intermediate position between the managing directors 
representing the board of the enterprise one the one hand, and the producers and 
providers of  health services on the other. However, whereas in the past the parallel 
clinical management can be seen as an extension of the dominating professional groups 
(i.e. doctors and nurses) producing the services, the new model places the unitary clinic 
manager much closer to the managing director, obviously by degrading the benefit of 
any specific professional affiliation for the will and capacity to manage. As several of our 
respondents point out, the new position of clinic manager aims at cultivating the 
managerial role – not the professional role – to perfection. According to the managing 
director: «An ideal for running a clinic is that you want to take on a leadership function, i.e. that you 
possess a combination of enthusiasm and the will to manage, and that you have the required professional 
ballast.» The meaning of «professional ballast» is questionable. The recruitment pattern 
in our case shows that the new unitary clinic managers are recruited from different 
health professions (nurses, physicians, physio-chemists) but always with additional 
qualifications in administration and management. Their professional background is 
probably important in terms of making them more acceptable among the professionals, 
but as one clinic manager stresses, they understand their role not as a mix between 
professional and manager but as a full-time management occupation detached from the 
medical professions: «You choose either to go into management, or to remain a medical 
professional.» (Clinic manager) 
Despite this understanding of the role, the clinic managers in their strife towards 
cultivating management find themselves in a field of tension between professional and 
managerial concerns: 
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«As a clinic manager you cannot opt out of management – which is what we do in a very specific 
sense – both management and administration, but in a field of tension between professional and 
superior managerial concerns.» (Clinic manager) 
The new understanding of hospital management also involves the idea of «responsibility 
management». The clinic managers sense the expectation to take responsibility for 
defining objectives and strategies and for the results that is achieved by their unit. They 
must demonstrate how they meet objectives and be prepared to take the blame if 
anything goes wrong. This contrasts with the understanding of how the clinics were 
managed previously when responsibility was experienced as more fluid, diffuse and 
«schizophrenic»: 
«In a way we have to focus on management and try to make managerial decisions trickle down a 
system which previously also was financially managed, but in which one did not pay too much 
attention to financial conditions. As a former ward chief physician I have lived through a time 
when one used to go around saying: being a physician as well as a manager makes you 
schizophrenic. One has now defined the clinic manager as a purely administrative position, so 
that unit managers at lower levels in the hierarchy can step back and focus on 
professional concerns. (Clinic manager) 
Allegedly, the power and responsibility of the staffs also have been affected by the new 
understanding of management, with less involvement in decision-making and more 
focus on management support. This is how one of the staff managers experiences the 
new era: 
“The present management system assigns a leadership function to the clinic managers and a 
definite ‘provide for and implement’ role to the staff functions. The division lines are clearer now. 
In the old bipartite system it was much less clear who was in charge at ward level. There used to 
be two people (managers) and it was not clear who did what. Quite often at the staff level, we 
made a mess of things and took on managerial functions that strictly speaking belonged to the 
ward manager.» (Staff manager) 
The managers’ understanding of their new role(s) does not in all respects correspond 
with their experience of how things work, however. In particular, they experience that 
their room to manoeuvre as autonomous managers are constrained and hence their 
expectations of being fully in charge is not met, at least not yet:  
«There is still a long way to go before decision-making authority is delegated to the clinic manager 
level. We are too strongly controlled financially and the budgets are so detailed that every single 
little pair of tweezers is included in the budget with the result that you have little room to 
manoeuvre.»  (Clinic manager) 
Moreover, the constraints on the clinic managers’ autonomy is not merely a 
consequence of restricted delegation. The influence of their relatively autonomous 
subordinates, basing their power on vested professional authorities, also restrains them. 
Thus, the tension between management and profession is not done away with:  
«Sometimes it makes you smile at the fact that you live in quite a difficult world as director and 
clinic manager and in addition have a manager focus. You have to supply a service where others 
define the service and the quality of the services and you have no chance to set the price for the 
services. You have managers below whom you tell to keep the budgets, but you haven’t managed 
to get them to do it yet and it’s impossible to keep the budgets. They don’t want to keep to the 
activity targets that have been set. They say yes, but in reality they have no intention of doing it. I 
don’t put much effort into keeping within the budgets because their tradition is that they ask for 
more money next year. Really I should have sacked a couple of my section managers last year 
because they hadn’t kept the budgets.» (Clinic manager) 
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The distance between the understanding of the new roles assigned to them by the 
hospital reformers, and their conditions for fulfilling these roles, puts the clinic 
managers in a slightly «absurd» situation; they are expected to manage with responsibility 
and discretion, but at the same time they experience a number of organizational 
framework conditions that they cannot influence, as this clinic manager asserts: 
«It’s the conditions for action that is decisive. When it comes to authority, that’s quite clear. That 
has always been clear in hospitals. But taking responsibility and doing something with it is a 
huge challenge. We live in an absurd situation as clinic managers.»  
So what do clinic manager do to diminish the distance between the expectations they 
meet of making discretionary decisions and being accountable, on the one hand, and the 
obvious constraints that threatens to make discretion and real influence an «absurd» 
illusion on the other? How do they react when they are accepting responsibility for the 
results of the clinic without possessing the sufficient administrative power, authority and 
budget control over subordinate units?  
One strategy that turned up in our case was to direct more attention towards the 
earnings potential of the clinic. When the costs are hard to control, boosting the inflow 
of funds is one obvious alternative. At least some of our clinic managers reported 
creative initiatives towards boosting the income of the clinic. One of our respondents 
explains this as follows: 
«What tricks do you use to make things work with the reforms – then you come back to ‘what’s 
in it for me?’ There’s of course no doubt that you use the dynamics and the upheavals in the 
health sector to obtain results in your own clinic. So it’s suddenly the case that you have to 
produce more. If not you’ll be squeezed out. That’s used consciously. That’s the technique, of 
course, here.» 
Another explained the following about the basic philosophy linked to enterprise 
management:  
«From whatever company in the private sector you will be able to recognise the principles of value-
based management. … Value-based management means that you emphasise management 
principles that focus on value creation. It’s not ethics and morality but it’s a matter of enforcing 
management indicators and putting greater pressure on increased value creation. What’s 
interesting is value creation – that happens out there in every single hospital.» 
The earnings strategy 
In March 2003 a leading Norwegian newspaper revealed that our case hospital had 
reported a strikingly large number of children having their tonsils removed and at the 
same time coded the patients with the additional diagnose of sleep apnoea (snoring): 
«Removed tonsils, added snoring and earned 4 million kroner» (Aftenposten 12.03.03). By 
investigating the Norwegian Patient Register the newspaper uncovered that the 
combined diagnosis of tonsillectomy and sleep apnoea occurred in 105 cases for the 
whole country in the first eight months of 2002. Our case hospital had reported 58 out 
of these 105 cases.  
When the newspaper documented that the top management in the health enterprise 
had recommended that all hospitals in the enterprise entered agreements with a doctor 
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at the National Hospital who had developed a system for recoding diagnoses in ear, 
nose and throat, the disclosure assumed major public attention. The recoding strategy 
was undertaken to increase the income of the hospitals, in effect amounting to several 
million Norwegian kroner. As part of the agreement the ‘consultant’ (the National 
Hospital doctor) was to receive a ten per cent commission from the additional income 
that the hospitals received.  
The Minister of Health and the ministry appointed an external firm of auditors to 
investigate the case.1 When SINTEF-Unimed later investigated the annual accounts of 
hospitals around the country where the refunds from the state had risen most, questions 
were asked about incorrect coding in fourteen local health enterprises altogether. For 
the time being, a government committee is investigating six different instances of 
doubtful coding. 
 The scope of the coding scandal has been extended since the Ministry of Health and 
the government started their investigations in the spring of 2003. A total of 19 hospitals 
(local health enterprises) have had to explain their sudden swings towards more 
profitable diagnoses and treatments. 
A concluding discussion  
Without proposing that dubious coding practices have become the order of the day in 
the Norwegian enterprise hospital, nonetheless the question has to be raised whether 
the expectations that seem to be embedded in the new definition of management and 
the understanding of the enterprise organization structure explain the occurrence of 
bold earnings initiatives, like the effort to exploit the DRG financing system.2 The 
enterprise structure, the introduction of the unitary management model and also the 
patient choice of hospital, a device that encourages competition, are most appropriately 
seen as a further step in the accomplishment of performance management in the 
Norwegian hospital sector. Management by objectives, the DRG-system and framework 
budgeting were implemented earlier. Now, by setting up an enterprise structure that 
underlined the financial autonomy of the hospital and rejected the bipartite management 
model that involved the doctors in the running of the clinics, in favour of professional 
managers that were expected to rectify the budget control problems and at the same 
time reduce patient queues, the responsibility of the future performance of the hospital 
sector was put on the shoulders of the new elite of professional managers. Despite the 
                                                 
1 For a time there was also the possibility that the health region’s management would be reported to the police. When 
the health director was made aware of the case, he wanted to report the management to the police immediately to 
safeguard data and documentary evidence. However, the ministry, which appointed a firm of auditors to look at the 
case, stopped this immediately and then later the government appointed a committee of enquiry. The committee 
concluded later (in a report and letter to the health enterprise 12.06.03) that the enterprise, due to illegitimate 
coding, should repay the illegally obtained refund amounting to 2 847 340 ,- NKr.  
2 In Norway previous refunding practices and framework financing have been replaced by fixed rate contracts 
through so-called diagnosis-related piecemeal financing (DRG). About 50% of the hospitals’ revenue is now 
determined on the basis of the number of patients who receive treatment, while the remaining revenue is obtained 
from framework financing. 
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experience that their influence on their subordinates in practice was very constrained, 
this new elite of managers – our informants in any case – accepted that this was the 
newborn understanding of management in the hospital sector. In order to be considered 
a successful manager you have to accomplish both budget control and improved 
treatment and processing capacity at the clinic, hospital and enterprise level.  
In accepting this definition of management, the new managerial elite already likened 
their position to management as is was understood in the private sector, alluding to 
popular ideas like «value based management», which is primarily associated with making 
values for the shareholders. In so doing, the new managerial class runs the risk of 
violating the value systems and practices of the medical profession, focused as it is on 
the professional task as opposed to the interests of the owner of the hospital. 
Historically, the medical profession in Norway, the «medicracy», has been accused of 
appropriating the health bureaucracy (Berg 1987; Vareide 2001). It has also appeared to 
be more or less «anti-capitalist», aloof from financial realities and considerations of cost, 
yet with a professional mandate to manage in a system in which it was the professional 
status that counted above everything else. Management was based on the «logic of 
appropriateness» rather than the «logic of consequentiality» (March & Olsen 1989; 
Vareide 2002; Zeuthen Bentsen 2003). Accordingly, the medical practitioners have 
historically paid little attention to coding practices after the introduction of the DRG-
based piecemeal financing system on July 1. 1997. It has been claimed that hospitals lose 
a lot of money because of the physicians’ lack of inclination to deal with coding in a 
proper fashion. The times seem to have changed, however. It is not only the enterprise 
management that focus on value creation through benign coding. Also consulting firms 
have entered this market, offering software that guides the operator through the DRG 
system by asking questions about additional or borderline diagnoses that may be added. 
The physicians’ new context invites them to make the most of their medical discretion.  
Whereas at the outset there seems to be a gulf between those who practise 
management and those who practise medicine (Gabe, Kelleher and Williams 1974), the 
coding scandal could be taken as an illustration of how the new tier of managers 
degraded the trust and legitimacy that historically have been vested in the medical 
profession. If we keep in mind that these managers were once health workers and 
professionals themselves, however, focus might be directed towards how the incentives 
and expectations that are embedded in the reforms of the hospital sector influence the 
actors within the system. There is no reason to doubt that these managers were well 
aware of the professional values of their professions, yet they accepted that in the new 
system these values must be tamed – or balanced – by the values of professional 
performance management. One interesting question, then, is whether these managers in 
fact end up as deserters from their profession(s) or are able to maintain the position of 
being both professional managers and professional health workers (Llewelyn 2001), not 
merely in their own eyes but more so in the apprehension of their subordinates. 
Our primary data does not give us precise information about whether the illegitimate 
coding practice in our case hospital was disclosed as a result of divergences between the 
medical professions and the enterprise management. This is not unlikely, however, 
According to rumours, medical professionals had for a long time felt themselves to be 
on the defensive in relation to the new, non-medical management elite. Moreover, 
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doctors and other professionals were professionally amazed and annoyed by the high 
profits the hospital made. The high profits at the clinic were hard to explain 
professionally, and many saw the coding practice as unfair in a political situation where 
health institutions were threatened by layoffs, mergers, shut-down or other initiatives at 
reorganization. In fact, the other units within the health enterprise had denied the offer 
of using the coding consultant from the National Hospital.  
None the less, the occurrence must be understood in the light of the tension that 
exist between the ideas of the new organization model and professional management, 
and the idea that public hospitals, and indeed the entire health sector, must be more 
transparent in order to provide the basis for patient choice and the control of public 
finances. Contrary to most private companies, the enterprise hospital must release a 
series of performance data about its business, including the DRG, patient queues, 
patient laytimes, patient complaints etc. The media, researchers, patient organizations, 
the Ministry of Health, the Public Accounts Committee and other stakeholders are 
scrutinizing these data more or less on a regular basis. And again contrary to most 
private enterprises, and for reasons we have already mentioned, the health sector cannot 
count on the same level of loyalty to management from the operating members of the 
organization, particularly in times of contested change. Therefore, to get away with 
large-scale cheating or dubious practices is probably more difficult than in the private 
sector, although the outward ethical values may be the same. The consequence is that 
the harsh constraints that the hospital and clinic managers meet in their strife to master 
the new management role not only emerge from internal traditions and legacies. The 
public quest for transparency easily entraps the «autonomous» and «accountable» 
manager in the tension between internal and external constraints. It is a reasonable to 
conclude that what happened to our informants was exactly that.  
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